Does the holding at T1 control the issue at T2?

Interpreting the holding at T1 such that it controls / does not control the issue at T2

In the examples below, the holding at T1 is horizontal or vertical precedent (it does not matter which) in relation to the new case at T2.

**Example #1**
Rule (holding at T1): Add three to an even number.
Facts at T2: Six.
Analysis: The T1 holding controls the facts at T2. Because six is an even number, it is subject to the rule, “Add three to an even number.”

**Example #2**
Rule (holding at T1): Add three to an even number but add nothing to an odd number.
Facts at T2: Five.
Issue at T2: Should something be added to five?
Analysis: The T1 holding controls the issue at T2. Because five is an odd number, it is subject to the rule, “add nothing to an odd number.”

**Example #3**
Rule (holding at T1): Add three to an even number but add nothing to an odd number.
Facts at T2: Five.
Issue at T2: Should five be multiplied by some number?
Analysis: The T1 holding does not control the issue at T2. The rule at T1 is a rule about when and what to add, not a rule about when and what to multiply.

**Example #4**
Rule (holding at T1): Add three to an even number.
Facts at T2: Five.
Analysis:
- If the T1 holding is interpreted to mean, “Add three to an even number but add nothing to an odd number,” then the T1 holding controls the facts at T2 (we are back to example #3).
- But if the T1 holding is interpreted to mean, “Add three to an even number; ours is a case about even numbers, and we take no stand on odd numbers,” then the T1 holding does not control the facts at T2. What to do at T2 is open on this second interpretation of the holding at T1.

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A. The precedential bearing of the holding in Blanchflower on the Rosa-Hector-Lawrence scenario (midterm) is just like the relationship between the rule and the facts in example #1.

B. The precedential bearing of the **holding** in Smith on the Watson scenario is like the relationship between the rule and the facts in example #4, on the *second* interpretation of example #4’s T1 holding. But the precedential bearing of the **holding plus rationale** in Smith on the Watson scenario is somewhat like the relationship between the rule and the facts in example #4, on the *first* interpretation of example #4’s T1 holding.

C. Boyd was decided at T1. At T2, P was injured when she drank 7-Up from a bottle of 7-Up that contained a cigar stub. D 7-Up Bottling Co. moves to dismiss P’s negligence suit, contending that D owed P no duty of care due to the absence of privity. On what interpretation of Boyd does Boyd’s holding control the question of law presented at T2 by D’s motion to dismiss? On what interpretation of Boyd does Boyd’s holding not control the question?