Nina Walton

Adjunct Professor of LawUSC Gould School of Law

Nina Walton
Work: (213) 740-7683
Fax: (213) 740-5502
699 Exposition Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90089-0074 USA Room: 442

Download vCard
Download Curriculum Vitae

last updated Tue, Jul 9, 2013

Nina Walton is an Adjunct Professor of Law who specializes in law and economics, regulation, corporate governance, and game theory. She teaches Business Organizations and Corporate Governance.

Walton earned her B.A. in political science and her LL.B. from the University of New South Wales in Australia. She practiced law in Australia for two years before moving to the United States and working as a project manager for Gap International. She received a Masters of Public Policy, and Ph.D. in economics from UCLA. At UCLA, she taught in the School of Public Affairs for a year before spending three years as a teaching fellow in the Department of Economics.

Walton's current research focuses on theories of corporate governance. She has examined the usefulness of outside advisors in assisting directors carrying out their monitoring duties. She has investigated how much power shareholders would like to grant managers of a company in circumstances where shareholders may have different goals for the company. She has also written on the topic of executive compensation. In an additional line of research, Walton is investigating matches between candidates for political office and political consultants. This project is designed to address questions concerning how candidates choose their consultants, whether candidates manage these relationships to minimize moral hazard, and how consultants build their reputations over time. Walton has written several academic papers, which may be found on SSRN.

Articles and Book Chapters

  • "Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation," 13.2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2011). - (SSRN)
  • "Offers of Compromise: The Law and Economics of Settlement Strategy in Australia," Asia Pacific Law and Economic Review (2011) (with Tamir Maltz).
  • "Delegated Monitoring: When can boards rely on outside experts?" American Law and Economics Review (2011). - (SSRN)
  • "The Price of Admission: Who gets into private school and how much do they pay?" 29(5) Economics of Education Review 738-750 (October 2010). - (SSRN)

Other Works

  • "On the Optimal Allocation of Power Between Shareholders and Managers." - (SSRN)
  • "Moral Hazard in Campaigns: Do political candidates keep hiring their consultants?" (with Nicholas Weller). - (SSRN)