A few comments about the reading.

I am sending a chapter from my book, *Rethinking the Good*. The chapter I am sending is fairly self-contained, but it does come as the 12th chapter of the book and I am aware that its importance may not be as obvious read as a separate chapter as it would be in the context of having read the preceding chapters. Accordingly, I am also sending along an overview of the book which I recently wrote for a symposium on the book this in *Analysis*. If you have time, you might find it useful to read or skim the overview before delving into the chapter, which has the arguments which the overview, per force, neglects. The chapter is fairly long, so it might make most sense to focus on the material through sections 12.4, though the remaining sections are also important.

In any event, I realize that although you could probably work out their meanings from context, since many of the chapter’s terms are my own, and they are crucial to the discussion, I thought it might help for me to pass along four key definitions that originally appear earlier in the book. Also, I’m assuming we’ll focus on chapter 12, but I’m willing to discuss any question that might arise connected with the overview, as well, if people are interested.

I hope the seminar is going well, and greatly look forward to my visit and to talking with the seminar members about the issues raised in the material I’m sending.

Warmly yours,

Larry

Four key definitions:

**Essentially Comparative View of Moral Ideals, 371**
Roughly, there is at least one moral ideal, $F$, and at least one outcome, $O$, such that there is no answer to the question of how good $O$ is regarding $F$, based solely on $F$’s internal features; or, even if, for each moral ideal, $F$, and each outcome, $O$, there is an answer to the question of how good $O$ is regarding $F$ based solely on $O$’s internal features, there is at least one ideal, $F$, and two outcomes $O_1$ and $O_2$, such that how $O_1$ compares with $O_2$ regarding $F$ is not simply a function of the extent to which $O_1$ is good with respect to $F$ based solely on $O_1$’s internal features and the extent to which $O_2$ is good with respect to $F$ based solely on $O_2$’s internal features.

**Essentially Comparative View of Outcome Goodness, 371**
Roughly, there is at least one outcome, $O$, such that there is no answer to the question of how good $O$ is all things considered based solely on $O$’s internal features; or, even if, for each outcome, $O$, there is an answer to the question of how good $O$ is all things considered
based solely on $O$’s internal features, there are at least two outcomes, $O_1$ and $O_2$, such that how $O_1$’s goodness compares with $O_2$ all things considered is not simply a function of the extent to which $O_1$ is good, all things considered, based solely on $O_1$’s internal features and the extent to which $O_2$ is good, all things considered, based solely on $O_2$’s internal features.

Internal Aspects View of Moral Ideals, 369-70
Roughly, for each outcome, $O$, and each moral ideal, $F$, there is an extent to which outcome $O$ is good with respect to $F$ which depends solely on $O$’s internal features. Moreover, for any two outcomes, $O_1$ and $O_2$, and any moral ideal $F_1$, $O_1$ will be better than $O_2$ regarding $F_1$, if and only if the extent to which $O_1$ is good regarding $F_1$, as determined solely on the basis of $O_1$’s internal features, is greater than the extent to which $O_2$ is good regarding $F_1$, as determined solely on the basis of $O_2$’s internal features. In addition, if $O_1$ is better than $O_2$ regarding any moral ideal $F_1$, the extent to which this is so will depend solely on the extent to which $O_1$ is good regarding $F_1$ is greater than the extent to which $O_2$ is good regarding $F_1$.

Internal Aspects View of Outcome Goodness, 370
Roughly, for each outcome, $O$, how good that outcome is all things considered depends solely on how good it is with respect to each moral ideal that is relevant for assessing the goodness of outcomes, and on how much all of the relevant ideals matter vis-à-vis each other, where these depend solely on $O$’s internal features. Moreover, for any two outcomes, $O_1$ and $O_2$, $O_1$ will be better than $O_2$ all things considered if and only if the extent to which $O_1$ is good all things considered, as determined solely on the basis of $O_1$’s internal features, is greater than the extent to which $O_2$ is good all things considered, as determined solely on the basis of $O_2$’s internal features. In addition, if $O_1$ is better than $O_2$ all things considered, the extent to which this is so will depend solely on the extent to which $O_1$ is good, all things considered, is greater than the extent to which $O_2$ is good, all things considered.

Like Comparability for Equivalents, Principle of, 237
According to this principle, if two outcomes or prospects are equivalent (meaning equally good) in some respect, then however the first of those outcomes or prospects compares to a third outcome or prospect in that respect, that is how the second of those outcomes or prospects compares to the third outcome or prospect in that respect.